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The number of bankruptcy cases (relative to the total ﬁrm population) varies signiﬁcantly
across countries. Factors inﬂuencing this diﬀerence should be the quality of the legal system, the
structure and quality of the ﬁrm population, and, as well, the behavior of the creditors. Banks play
an important role as creditors in many European countries, and thus, in the event of default, their
behavior is crucial. However, because they do not take suﬃcient action against defaulting ﬁrms,
they are often regarded as passive. So far, the explanations for creditor passivity are based on the
fact that, by having ﬁrms declared bankrupt, banks reveal information about the quality of their
portfolio. However, when banks bankrupt ﬁrms they also reveal information about the quality of
a ﬁrm to both the public, and in particular, to their competitors - the other banks.
If we want to explain why banks remain passive, the following questions arise. What are the
gains and losses of creditors when they have defaulting ﬁrms declared bankrupt? Which institutions
matter for this decision? What is the eﬀect of bank competition on the incentives of creditors?
Since the decision to have defaulting ﬁrms declared bankrupt should have an impact on the credit
market, we also want to know how interest rates and the supply of loans are inﬂuenced by the
number of bankruptcies ﬁled and by the institutions that determine this number.
Before starting the analysis, it is necessary to clarify how the decision to have a ﬁrm declared
bankrupt aﬀects the creditor. First, petitioning to have a ﬁrm declared bankrupt is supposed to
provide the lenders with a return and, second, “bankruptcy information is publicly disseminated to
alert present creditors and potential lenders” (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002, p. 2028). Having a ﬁrm
declared bankrupt therefore inﬂuences the information available to the bank’s competitors and the
rents the banks can extract.
In this paper we study how these two eﬀects inﬂuence the bank’s decision to ﬁle a petition
to have a ﬁrm declared bankrupt. For our analysis of the bank’s incentive, we set up a model
of bank-ﬁrm relationship. The banking sector consists of two banks that compete in Bertrandfashion. They have granted loans to ﬁrms in the previous period, but these “old ﬁrms” defaulted
on their loans. However through the business relationship the bank is informed about their future
creditworthiness, i.e. it observes whether an old ﬁrm is creditworthy (or “good”) or not (or “bad”).
The market shares of the “informed” banks are diﬀerent and the bigger bank thus has information
about more old ﬁrms. Moreover, ﬁrms without a bank relationship apply for loans. As the outside
bank cannot perfectly screen the ﬁrms applying for credit, the repayment it requires if it makes
zero expected proﬁt depends on the average quality of borrowers who apply to this bank for credit
for the ﬁrst time. Good old ﬁrms cannot signal their type to an outside bank and therefore face a
typical hold-up problem.
The main contribution of the paper is to study how the informed bank can use bankruptcy
applications strategically. It decides whether to bankrupt a bad old ﬁrm or not. In making this
decision, there is a trade-oﬀ between two opposing eﬀects. If a ﬁrm is declared bankrupt, the bank
receives a liquidation payoﬀ.I ft h eﬁrm is not declared bankrupt, it will reapply for credit from an
outside bank. As more bad old ﬁrms apply for credit, the repayment that an outside bank needs to
break even increases. This increases the hold-up problem that each good old ﬁrm faces and gives
the informed bank the opportunity to extract higher rents from its existing customers. Conversely,
if a ﬁrm is declared bankrupt, the bank loses information rent.
We derive three main results from our analysis. First, banks remain passive and have ﬁrms not
declared bankrupt strategically in order to soften bank competition and this allows them to extract
higher information rents. Second, we show that more bad old ﬁrms are declared bankrupt either
if institutions improve (and the liquidation value increases) or if bank competition becomes more
intense (and the rent extracted decreases). Third, better institutions and more bank competition
feed back positively into the credit market. As this increases the number of bankruptcy cases,
the adverse selection problem between banks decreases. Thereby, ceteris paribus, the repayment
oﬀered decreases and the probability of banks granting loans increases.
This paper relates to the literature on the interdependence between law and ﬁnance, on creditor
2passivity, and on information exchange through credit registries.1 The law and ﬁnance literature
asserts that creditor protection has a positive inﬂuence on the development of credit markets (La
Porta et al., 1998). Both the legal protection of creditors and the quality of the courts in a country
contribute to higher levels of private credit (Djankov et al., 2007). A similar result is obtained for
judicial eﬃciency in Italy. Credit is less widely available in the Italian provinces where trials take
longer or backlogs of pending trials are larger (Fabbri and Padula, 2004; Jappelli et al., 2005). In
their theoretical model, Fabbri and Padula (2004) argue that a better judicial system increases the
liquidation payoﬀ of collateral. If the liquidation value that the bank gets increases, interest rates
can fall and more ﬁrms will demand loans. However, their study, which uses household data from
Italy, shows that the eﬀect of a household pledging collateral on the availability of credit is positive
but not signiﬁcant (Fabbri and Padula, 2004). This suggests that the claim that better institutions
increase access to ﬁnance via the higher liquidation value the bank gets does not fully explain the
observations in Italy. Alternatively, the interaction between the two eﬀects of bankruptcy that we
study in this paper, namely the generation of a payoﬀ for the lender and the provision of information
about the quality of the borrower, might explain the higher availability of credit in regions with
better legal institutions.
Like all creditor rights, the eﬀectiveness of bankruptcy is inﬂuenced both by the law itself and
its enforcement. Thus, the quality of the institutions determines the lender’s liquidation payoﬀ.
Claessens and Klapper (2005) show that the number of bankruptcies is higher, the better the
institutions. However, they also ﬁnd that, in combination with stronger creditor rights, greater
judicial eﬃciency results in fewer cases of bankruptcy.2
Two explanations are given in the literature for the phenomenon of creditor passivity. First, if
1We use the term credit registry to capture both public and private credit registries since we do not discriminate
between them. Private credit registries are often called credit bureaus.
2In the theoretical literature, the eﬀect of formal bankruptcy rules on ex ante and ex post incentives has been
studied intensively (for a discussion see Stiglitz, 2001). In addition, the relationship between bankruptcy codes and
the ﬁrm’s capital structure has been investigated in several papers.
3banks are poorly capitalized, they are gambling that, by rolling over debts to defaulting customers,
there is a chance these would eventually repay (Perotti, 1993). Second, it is argued that banks are
reluctant to liquidate ﬁrms because they do not want to provide information about the share of non-
performing loans in their portfolio (Aghion et al., 1999; Mitchell, 2001). The strategic application
of bankruptcy ﬁlings in these papers only matters if the policy decision of bank recapitalization
is considered. However, bank recapitalization does not happen regularly. Moreover, the strategic
aspect of the decision to bankrupt a ﬁrm matters not only in the (infrequent) interaction with the
regulator but, even more so, in the competition with other banks.
Bankruptcy and credit registries can be seen as substitutes as both of them provide information
about incumbent customers. Generally, information can either be about the borrower’s type or
about past performance with regard to the project outcome or default. The exchange of information
about borrower type through private credit registries is studied by Pagano and Jappelli (1993). In
the basic setup, the banks, which are local monopolies, beneﬁt from an information exchange
through declining default rates. Introducing bank competition makes information sharing less
likely because it reduces the informational rent a bank can extract. This negative eﬀect of bank
competition vanishes in a model in which bank competition improves the incentive for a ﬁrm to
exert eﬀort and, consequently, increases the rent a bank extracts (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). In
a companion paper, Padilla and Pagano (2000) study the case where rents are competed away ex
ante. In this case, it is better to show information only about the outcome of a project because,
here, the ﬁrm has the bigger incentive to work hard. The extent to which information about its
customers is revealed can also be used by a bank to deter entry (Boukaert and Degryse, 2006).
We contribute to this literature by studying the banks’ decision to have defaulting ﬁrms declared
bankrupt, the strategic aspect of this decision, and its impact on the credit market. We extend
the model by Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) on adverse selection between banks by incorporating the
bankruptcy decision. In this framework, we study how asymmetric information between banks
allows informed banks to extract rents from its customers. Like information provided by a credit
4registry, the fact that a ﬁrm is declared bankrupt reveals to the public that a ﬁrm is unsuccessful.
This inﬂuences the information asymmetry between banks and thus the rent that can be extracted.
In contrast to displaying information to a credit registry, the bank’s decision to have a ﬁrm declared
bankrupt yields a payoﬀ to the bank. Therefore, our model explains why even competitive banks
may have an incentive to display information about their borrower’s type. In contrast to most
papers in this area, the banks do not face a commitment problem with regard to the display of
information.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we ﬁr s td e v e l o pt h ec r e d i tm a r k e tg a m ei na
model with two banks and study the impact of corporate bankruptcy on repayments. We limit the
analysis there to the case with two banks to make the diﬀerent eﬀects that interact in this model as
clear as possible. In section 3, we analyze the bank’s incentive to have defaulting borrowers declared
bankrupt. Comparative statics allows us to show how institutions inﬂuence the bank’s decision.
In section 4, we discuss the eﬀects in a model with N identical banks. In section 5, empirical
implications are derived. Finally, we discuss alternative policies that improve the decision of the
bank with regard to ﬁrm bankruptcy.
I. Model of the Credit Market
In the next subsection, we explain the reasons for the setup we chose in section 2.2. and
describe the credit market, the decision to have ﬁrms declared bankrupt, and institutions that
inﬂuence them.
(1) Description of the Credit Market
Credit markets are characterized by asymmetric information both between ﬁrms and banks
and between banks themselves. Information between banks is asymmetric because the informed
bank, i.e., the bank that has already established a business relationship with the ﬁrm, has better
information about its customers than the outside banks. Norden and Weber (2007) ﬁnd that, by
keeping a ﬁrm’s checking account, a bank becomes informed.
5Credit registries have evolved to reduce both kinds of information asymmetries. Usually, the
credit registries provide information about past defaults. The reach of credit registries diﬀers
signiﬁcantly between countries. In OECD countries, private and public credit registries cover a
substantial share of the population (on average 65 per cent), but their coverage is not universal.
Even among the OECD countries, there are countries such as Switzerland where only 25 per cent of
the adult population is covered.3 In other regions, the coverage is signiﬁcantly lower. For instance,
for (Eastern) Europe and Central Asia it is eight per cent (World Bank, 2006). Moreover, the
reputation of credit registries in some countries suﬀe r sa st h ed a t aq u a l i t yi sp o o ra n di n a c c u r a c i e s
occur. Complaints about the reliability of information are more frequently found in emerging
markets (for Russia, see Skogoreva, 2005) but are not unheard of in economies with well-developed
institutions (for the US, see Cassady and Mierzwinski, 2004).
Another mechanism through which information is revealed is the decision to have defaulting
ﬁrms declared bankrupt. In this case, information not only about a borrower’s behavior but also
about its type becomes publicly available. The latter indicates that the borrower is no longer
creditworthy. A bankruptcy ﬁling implies that a borrower’s assets are frozen. For the borrower,
this means that it becomes more diﬃcult to mimic a borrower that applies for credit at a bank for the
ﬁrst time. One strategy could be to reopen as a new ﬁrm which does the same business but under a
new name. If the borrower could mimic a new ﬁrm, the defaulting borrower might have a chance of
g e t t i n ga c c e s st oan e wb a n kl o a n . 4 The chances of getting a new loan increase if information about
past ﬁnancial transactions is opaque either because a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statement is not informative
enough or because a credit registry that contains information about the owner’s past behavior is
3This example was selected because the coverage reported by Jappelli and Pagano (2002) and by Worldbank
(2006) is rather similar. For other countries, the ﬁgures diverge signiﬁcantly. For instance, for Denmark Jappelli and
Pagano (2002) report a coverage for the year 1996 through private credit registries of 50.3 per cent whereas the most
recent ﬁgure by the World Bank (2006) is only 7.7 per cent. For Sweden, Jappelli and Pagano report that, in 1997,
24.1 per cent were covered by private credit registries whereas in World Bank (2006) it is 100 per cent.
4For Hungary and Slovakia, there is evidence that some defaulting ﬁrms were able to get loans from outside banks.
I would like to thank Gyöngyi Lóránth and Anton Malesich for providing me this information.
6missing. Evidence from the US shows that accurate credit information has substantially greater
predictive power for the performance of ﬁrms than data contained in ﬁnancial statements (Kallberg
and Udell, 2003). In emerging markets, this mimicking strategy should be successful more often as
auditing hardly ever occurs and overseeing institutions and credit registries are still in the process
of being developed.
There is a creditor chapter in the bankruptcy codes of most countries that implies that the
bank can commence a bankruptcy procedure and, with the exception of the United States, creditors
dominate the bankruptcy initiation decision (Pistor, 2006). Usually, the creditor has some scope
for deciding which ﬁrm it will have declared bankrupt. The negative experience which Hungary
had when it invented an automatic trigger shows that rules should not be formulated too strictly
(Bonin and Schaﬀer, 2002). The aim of the creditor is to get a payoﬀ from the defaulting ﬁrm. In
general, diﬀerent routes can be taken in a bankruptcy procedure: either a ﬁrm can be reorganized
or its assets are liquidated. The recovery rate reﬂects the quality of the institutions and captures
two eﬀects. First, weak institutions imply that the debtor retains part of the collateralizable wealth
or its payoﬀ. Secondly, if institutions work imperfectly, there is a signiﬁcant deadweight loss from
liquidating assets, such as the costs of the legal process itself. The Doing Business Report 2006
shows that the recovery rates vary strongly. In the OECD countries the liquidation value, which is
the net present value of revenues from selling the assets net of costs, is 74 per cent on average. In
the other regions, it is never above 30 per cent (World Bank, 2006).
(2) Model
We use a two-period model à la Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) to capture the speciﬁc relationship
between ﬁrms and banks. Before starting the analysis, we describe the characteristics of the bor-
rowers and the banking sector. Our analysis starts with the case of two banks. Subsequently, in
section 4, we discuss the eﬀects in a model with N symmetric banks. Both banks were lending
in the ﬁrst period but they diﬀer in the number of bad old ﬁrms they have information about.
The reason for this diﬀerence can either be that they had diﬀerent shares in the credit market or
7they had equal shares but the share of bad old ﬁrms in their credit portfolio diﬀers. We model
a situation in which they had diﬀerent shares in the credit market and argue in the discussion in
section 4 why this is comparable to a situation in which the quality of the portfolios diﬀers. Bank
1 had a market share in the credit market of s1,b a n k2 of s2 (= 1 − s1), where we assume that
s1 >s 2. There is no entry and no exit in the banking sector at the beginning of period 2.T h e
costs of raising funds are normalized to zero.
There are two diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms. First, there are the new customers who seek to establish
ab a n k - ﬁrm relationship for the ﬁrst time. New ﬁrms will be successful with probability q.I f
successful, a new ﬁrm generates a payoﬀ X. Secondly, there are the old customers who already
have established a bank-ﬁrm relationship by lending from a bank in the ﬁrst period. We restrict our
analysis to all old customers who defaulted on the loans that they received from the informed bank
in the ﬁrst period. The reason for default can either be illiquidity or insolvency and is observed
by the bank that has granted the loan. Among these old ﬁrms a proportion p defaulted because
they are illiquid although they are solvent and will be successful in period 2, generating a return
of X. They are called “good old ﬁrms”. However, a proportion of (1 − p) will fail in the second
period as well because they are insolvent; they are called “bad old ﬁrms”. Moreover, old ﬁrms that
have a project with a positive return in the ﬁr s tp e r i o ds h o u l da l s oe x i s t .I nc o n t r a s tt ot h eg o o d
old ﬁrms, which we focus on in our analysis, they could signal their type to an outside bank and
would not face the hold-up problem described here. Thus, with our setup we focus our analysis on
those ﬁrms that have an incentive to announce that they are new ones. The number of ﬁrms is
normalized to 1;t h es h a r eo fo l dc u s t o m e r si sμ and that of new customers is (1 − μ).
The distribution of old and new ﬁrms and their qualities are common knowledge. In the ﬁrst
period, the old ﬁrms received a loan in the amount of I1 and thereby established a bank-ﬁrm
relationship in which the informed bank learns their type. Based on the interaction during the
previous bank relationship, the informed bank perfectly observes whether a ﬁrm’s default was
8caused by illiquidity or insolvency.5 We assume that no information sharing through a credit
registry takes place. Moreover, the banks cannot screen the credit applicants eﬃciently. According
to the stylized facts, the limited information revealed by ﬁnancial statements, and the sometimes
inaccurate information contained in credit registries (if these exist at all), make it more diﬃcult
for a bank to verify whether a ﬁrm has previously received a loan.6 For the model, we assume that
banks cannot discriminate between old and new customers. In this setup, banks oﬀer a pooling
contract. We discuss the eﬀects of screening and information exchange at the end of section 2.3..
The ﬁrms are endowed with assets that are liquidated in the case of bankruptcy. After period
1, the informed bank decides whether to force their defaulting customers to undergo a bankruptcy
procedure or to forgive them their debt. We assume that the bank cannot be forced by law to
initiate a bankruptcy procedure if it knows that a ﬁrm will not be successful in the future. The
share of bad old ﬁrms that bank 1 (bank 2) has declared bankrupt is denoted by l1 (l2).W ed on o t
model the diﬀerent routes taken in a bankruptcy procedure, i.e. liquidation or reorganization. If a
ﬁrm is declared bankrupt, it becomes common knowledge that it is a bad ﬁrm. Moreover, the bank
obtains a liquidation value which is denoted by L. The liquidation value of assets is determined by
the costs of enforcing contracts and the proportion of the proceeds from liquidating the assets that
the bank receives. The liquidation value increases as the quality of the institutions, such as the
legal framework, improves. By the end of period 2, the assets become worthless. We assume that
the liquidation is socially optimal because the loss from liquidation is lower than the misallocation
of capital in the second period.
In the second period, the ﬁrms want to ﬁnance an indivisible investment project. They therefore
need credit amounting to I because they do not have their own liquid funds (for notational conve-
5If the informed bank had imperfect information about its incumbent customers, the size of eﬀects would change
but not the insights gained.
6A survey about consumer loans in the US shows that 54 per cent of credit reports contain personal demographic
information that was, for instance, misspelled, outdated, or otherwise incorrect. About 38 per cent of the reports did
not mention major credit, loan, mortages, or other consumer accounts (Cassady and Mierzwinski, 2004).
9nience, we do not use a subscript here). We assume that the expected return of the second period
X is high enough to cover the investment in the second period, i.e. X>I . Thus, it is optimal
to reﬁnance the good old ﬁrms. If a bad old ﬁrm manages to receive credit from an outside bank,
it invests the credit, as it gets private beneﬁts from staying in business. However, the investment
undertaken by the bad old ﬁrm is ineﬃcient as it will always fail and therefore the bad old ﬁrm
cannot repay the informed bank even though it is reﬁnanced by the outside bank.7 It is socially
optimal to ﬁnance new ﬁrms as qX ≥ I. Moreover, we assume that it is eﬃcient for bank 2 to lend
to new applicants because the return generated by new ﬁr m si sh i g he n o u g ht oc o v e rt h el o s s e s
made with bad old customers, i.e. (qX − I)(1− μ) > μs1 (1 − l∗
1)I (1 − p) where l∗
1 is the optimal
share of bad ﬁrms that bank 1 will have declared bankrupt. From this assumption it follows that,
relative to the rent extracted in the second period which is determined by I, the liquidation value
obtained from selling the assets of a debtor that defaulted in period 1 is high enough, i.e. L>I .8
Otherwise bank 1 would not have any defaulting ﬁrm declared bankrupt. In that case, bank 2
would make an expected loss and social welfare would decrease as bank 2 does not lend to new
applicants at all.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :a tt h ee n do ft h eﬁrst period, the informed bank decides
about ﬁling a petition to have defaulting customers declared bankrupt.9 Credit is granted at the
beginning of the second period. We assume that banks have two sequential moves. First, they
simultaneously choose the repayment for new applicants. Second, they determine the repayments
7We could also assume that the ﬁrm’s manager takes the loan from the outside bank and runs away with the
money.
8Evidence from emerging markets in Eastern Europe indicates that the value of assets pledged as collateral
considerably exceeds the amount of the loan (EBRD, 2006).
9Banks might have an incentive to let ﬁrms apply to the credit market and then decide about having them
declared bankrupt. This would allow the ﬁrm to demand a loan from the outside bank and use this loan to repay the
incumbent bank. Since we assume that the ﬁrms have an incentive to invest in order to stay in business, this it not
a feasible strategy for the banks. A ﬁrm would always invest the loan it gets from the outside bank and not repay
the incumbent bank.
10by their good old customers and deny credit to bad old customers. Finally, ﬁrms demand credit
f r o mt h eb a n kw i t ht h eb e s tc r e d i to ﬀer.
Moreover, we need some technical assumptions. Firms apply for credit at each bank in propor-
tion to their share in the total population. Old customers continue to borrow from the informed
bank if they are indiﬀerent between the oﬀers of incumbent and outside banks. Both the old cus-
tomers who do not stay with their informed bank and the new customers apply to the bank which
oﬀers the lowest repayment. If the two banks oﬀer the same repayment, the market is split between
them.
(3) Credit Contract
The game is solved by backward induction.10 The informed bank does not reﬁnance a bad old
ﬁrm since it would make an expected loss. Therefore, bad old ﬁrms apply at the outside bank
unless they were declared bankrupt.11 Thus, the outside bank faces a winner’s curse problem (see
Broecker, 1990, Sharpe, 1990, and von Thadden, 2004). In this section, we describe the credit
contract for a given share of bad old customers which their banks had declared bankrupt. Here,
we assume that (1 − l1)s1 > (1 − l2)s2 which we prove to be true in section 3.
Good old ﬁrms always stay with their informed bank. Therefore, we ﬁrst characterize the
repayment made by the ﬁrms that apply at an outside bank in the second period, which, like
Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), we will call “free market”. It can be shown that the informed bank
demands the same repayment as the outside bank does. Therefore, good old ﬁrms stay with their
informed bank and they pay as much as the ﬁrms that switch their bank or apply for credit for
10The hold-up problem which ﬁrms face in our model could be solved if banks granted credit lines. However, in
many emerging markets credit lines are not widely available. Instead, each investment is ﬁnanced by an individual
loan. In a theoretical analysis, Schmeits (2005) ﬁnds that contracts for individual loans dominate credit lines if the
bank’s monitoring ability is low and bank competition is limited. Both these criteria apply to emerging markets and
therefore her results justify our approach.
11Note that if a bad old ﬁrm were to reapply to its incumbent bank, the bank would recognize this ﬁrm and would
not grant a loan.
11the ﬁrst time. In the free market, an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. The reason is
that a marginal change in the repayments can lead to a discontinuous change in the bank’s proﬁts.
Banks decide about the repayment R, the cumulative distribution function of the repayments F1
and G2, and the probability of denying credit prob(D).P r o p o s i t i o n 1 shows the equilibrium in
mixed strategies.
Proposition 1. In period 2, the banks oﬀer the following repayments on the free market:
• Bank 1 oﬀers a repayment, according to the following cumulative distribution function
F1 (R1)=1 −
μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)
(1 − μ)(qR− I)
I∀R1 
 




and prob(R1 = X)=
μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)
(1 − μ)(qX − I)
I.
Bank 1 makes an expected proﬁto fIμ(1 − p)((1 − l1)s1 − (1 − l2)s2) from newly applying
ﬁrms.
• Bank 2 does not make an oﬀer with probability prob(D)=
μs1(1−l1)(1−p)
(1−μ)(qX−I) I. Provided that
it oﬀers a loan, it chooses repayments according to the following cumulative distribution
function
G2 (R2)=
(qX − I)((1 − μ)(qR− I) − μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)I)
(qR− I)((1− μ)(qX − I) − μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)I)
∀R2 
 





Bank 2 makes zero expected proﬁt.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When oﬀering the terms of a credit contract, the outside bank makes the ﬁrst move. The
informed bank can always oﬀer a credit contract to a good old customer that is as favorable as
the one oﬀered by the outside bank. Thus, in equilibrium, the good old customers stay with their
informed bank and repay as much as all other customers. The banks oﬀer a pooling contract for the
12remaining customers, namely the bad old ﬁrms and the new ﬁrms, because they cannot discriminate
between them.
As Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) show there is no equilibrium in pure strategies for the repayment
terms. In equilibrium, the banks mix continuously on the range [R,X) or do not bid at all. The
lowest repayment R is determined by the condition that the expected proﬁto fb a n k2, which has had
a lower market share in the previous period, is zero. Due to its resulting informational disadvantage
compared to bank 1,b a n k2 stays out of the market with positive probability and, therefore, makes
zero expected proﬁt from the newly applying customers. The repayment that bank 2 needs to break
even depends on bank 1’s market share as this determines the degree of asymmetric information
between banks. Bank 1’s repayments are chosen such that, in expected terms, it matches bank 2’s
repayment. Thus, bank 1 makes an expected proﬁto fΠFM = Iμ(1 − p)((1 − l1)s1 − (1 − l2)s2)
from new applicants for credit in period 2 where FM is used to denote the free market. The proﬁt
i sb a s e do nb a n k1’s informational advantage over bank 2 with regard to old ﬁrms.
The informed banks can extract a rent from all its good old customers denoted by ΠGO.T h e
rent is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. All good old ﬁrms receive a loan from their informed bank. However, they face a
hold-up problem. This allows both bank 1 and bank 2 to extract from each good old ﬁrm a rent
of
ΠGO =









(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− μ)
(1 − μ)q
I.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The good old customers face a hold-up problem because they cannot signal their type to an
outside bank. Thus, the informed bank can match the repayment the outside bank demands and
thereby it extract rents from each of these ﬁrms.12 Both banks mix on the same range and put the
12For the Czech Republic, where according to World Bank (2006) about one third of the population is covered by
private credit registries, information is available about the interest rates for outstanding loans and new businesses for
13same weight on each repayment. If bank 2 does not oﬀer a loan, bank 1 demands X as a repayment
from its incumbent customers. If bank 1 demands a repayment of X,b a n k2 also demands X from
its incumbent customers. The probability that bank 1 demands X and that bank 2 does not oﬀer a
loan are identical. As a result, both banks extract the same rent from their incumbent customers.
A comparative static analysis provides some important insights into the composition of the
rents. In general, we ﬁnd that the more severe the adverse selection problem between banks, the
higher is the rent that the incumbent bank can extract. Interestingly, the rent extracted does not
depend on bank 2’s market and the share of ﬁrms it has declared bankrupt (l2). The expected
repayments depend on the degree of adverse selection the smaller bank (bank 2)f a c e s ,w h i c h ,i n
turn, is determined by bank 1’s market share and the share of ﬁrms bank 1 has declared bankrupt
(l1). As bank 1 has more ﬁrms declared bankrupt (l1 increases), the number of bad old ﬁrms in
the population decreases. Thus, the quality of ﬁrms applying to the outside bank (bank 2)i nt h e
second period improves. As a result, the severity of the adverse selection problem decreases, and
therefore, the average repayment paid at the outside bank (bank 2) decreases. This reduces the
hold-up problem that good old ﬁrms face. Thus, the adverse selection problem between the two
banks increases in the market share of bank 1, s1, since bank 1 releases more bad old ﬁrms into
the pool of borrowers who then apply to an outside bank in period 2. Therefore, the expected
repayment increases because bank 2 puts more weight on higher repayments and denies credit with
a higher probability. The same argument applies if p,t h es h a r eo fo l dﬁrms, increases. Finally, the
distribution of new customers matters. The higher the proportion of good new ﬁrms, i.e. q,t h e
lower the repayment. The intuition is equivalent to a change in the make-up of the population of
old ﬁrms.
The discussion so far has shown that the size of the rent depends on the degree of adverse
selection between the two banks. We have assumed that banks do not perform any screening and
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. There, incumbent customers indeed pay higher interest rates, which is consistent with the fact
that they are held up by their informed bank (Czech National Bank, 2005).
14that they are not able to distinguish between old and new ﬁrms. Clearly, the degree of adverse
selection between banks decreases if information about applying ﬁrms can be generated, be it
through screening or through credit registries. However, as long as information is imperfect, the
adverse selection problem will remain.
II. Banks’ Decision to Have Defaulting Firms Declared Bankrupt
(1) Banks’ Incentives to Have Defaulting Firms Declared Bankrupt
In the analysis so far we have not explicitly modelled the decision of a bank to have its bad old
customers declared bankrupt and instead assumed that bank 1 releases more bad old ﬁrms into the
pool of borrowers than bank 2, i.e., (1 − l1)s1 > (1 − l2)s2. In the next step, we derive the optimal
share of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt by bank 1 and bank 2 denoted by l1 and l2, respectively.
When deciding about ﬁling petitions to have ﬁrms declared bankrupt, the bank trades oﬀ two
eﬀects. On the one hand, having ﬁrms declared bankrupt generates a payoﬀ for the bank. On the
other hand, it lowers the degree of asymmetric information between banks and thereby the rents
to be extracted. The rents come potentially from two sources: from the good old incumbent ﬁrms
that face the hold-up problem (ΠGO)a n df r o mt h ef r e em a r k e t( ΠFM). Both banks can hold-up
their incumbent customers but only the bank with the higher share of bad old ﬁrms in its portfolio
makes an expected positive proﬁt on the free market. The size of the rents depends on the share of
bad old ﬁrms, that each of the banks will have declared bankrupt, relative to the other. As shown
in Propositions 1 and 2, the decision of the bank that releases more bad old borrowers into the
pool of applicants determines the size of the rents.
Thus, bank i maximizes the following objective function when deciding about li:
Πi (li,l j)=μsili (1 − p)L + μsipΠGO (li,l j)+ΠFM(li,l j) (1)
The optimal decision of each bank depends on the decision of its competitor. By having a
defaulting ﬁrm declared bankrupt, the number of ﬁrms it has private information about - relative
15to its competitor - changes. The following proposition shows the liquidation decisions taken in
equilibrium.






of its bad old customers declared
bankrupt whereas bank 2 has all of them declared bankrupt, i.e., l2 =1 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Interestingly, the decision to liquidate a ﬁrm is independent of the outstanding debt, i.e. I1.
T h ea m o u n to fc r e d i tg r a n t e di nt h eﬁrst period is comparable to a sunk cost that no longer
inﬂuences the bank’s decision. Actually, the optimal fraction of ﬁrms bankrupted is determined by
the condition that the marginal loss in information rent equals the marginal return in liquidation
proceeds. The banks’ information rents depend on the degree of asymmetric information between
banks which is determined by the highest number of bad old ﬁrms a bank releases into the pool of
new applicants. For the bank which expects that its competitor will release a higher number of bad
old ﬁrms than it does itself, this implies that the marginal loss in information rents does not depend
on its own decision. For this bank, having a ﬁrm declared bankrupt creates a liquidation payoﬀ
but does not inﬂuence the rents from asymmetric information. Thus, the best decision is to have
all bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt. In contrast, if a bank expects to release the higher number of
bad old ﬁrms into the pool of new applicants, its decision is determined by the trade-oﬀ between
the marginal payoﬀ from liquidation and the marginal loss in rents from asymmetric information.
Which of the banks releases more bad old ﬁrms in equilibrium? In Proposition 3 we have proven
that it is always optimal for bank 2 to have all its bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt. Thus, bank
1 will release a fraction of (1 − l∗
1) of its bad old ﬁrms into the pool of new applicants. Given the
optimal decision of each of the banks, the (absolute) number of bad old ﬁrms released into the pool
of new applicants is always higher for bank 1 (the bigger bank).13
13If the two banks are identical in terms of market shares, mulitiple equilibria exist. Either bank 1 h a saf r a c t i o n
l
∗
1 of its bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt and bank 2 has all of them declared bankrupt or bank 2 h a saf r a c t i o nl
∗
2
of its bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt and bank 1 has all of them declared bankrupt.
16The following proposition summarizes how the equilibrium liquidation decision is inﬂuenced by
parameter changes.
Proposition 4. The higher the degree of bank competition, i.e., the lower s1, the higher the total
fraction of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt. However, the eﬀect of s1 on l∗
1 is ambiguous: for





∂s1 ≤ 0 and for s1 >   s1 we obtain
∂l∗
1
∂s1 > 0. As the liquidation
value L increases, the total fraction of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt increases.
Proof: See the Appendix.
For the whole banking sector, we ﬁnd that the total number of bankruptcy ﬁlings decreases in
s1.S i n c el∗
1 <l ∗
2 =1 , an increase in the market share of bank 1 implies that the share of bad old
ﬁrms declared bankrupt must decrease. The impact of bank competition on bank 1’s decision to
have ﬁrms declared bankrupt depends on bank 1’s market share s1. In equilibrium, the marginal
loss in information rent equals the marginal payoﬀ from liquidating assets. Bank 1’s market share
s1 inﬂuences bank 1’s marginal information rent both through the number of ﬁrms it receives a rent
from and the amount of the information rent that can be extracted from each ﬁrm. However, the
eﬀect of s1 on the marginal information rent is ambiguous. For s1 below the threshold value   s1,a
higher s1 decreases the marginal information rent. In equilibrium, the marginal loss of information
rent must equal the marginal beneﬁt of liquidation. For this reason, bank 1 lowers the share of
ﬁrms declared bankrupt (l1) such that the adverse selection problem becomes more severe again
and thus the marginal information rent increases so that it is equal to the marginal beneﬁtf r o m
liquidation. For s1 above the threshold value, a higher s1 increases the marginal information rent.
Thus, bank 1 increases the share of ﬁrms declared bankrupt (l1) such that the marginal information
rent decreases to its optimal level.
Obviously, better institutions increase the liquidation value and therefore provide better incen-
tives for liquidation. Therefore, the fraction of ﬁrms declared bankrupt increases as the liquidation
value L increases. In the setup of our model, it is vital that the liquidation value, which reﬂects the
17quality of (legal) institutions, exceeds a certain threshold. For this reason, we assumed that L>I.
Note that the threshold value for L depends only on the investment made in the second period
(denoted by I). The reason is that I determines the size of the information rents. If the condition
L>Iis not fulﬁlled, neither bank would have an incentive to have a bad old ﬁrm declared bankrupt
(l∗
1 = l∗
2 =0 ) . This would imply that the adverse selection problem between banks is severe. As a
result, the banks would not lend in the second period and new applicants would not receive loans.
Thus, for too low liquidation values, ﬁnancial intermediation breaks down for new ﬁrms. Formally,
this condition (L>I ) is obtained from the fact that it must be proﬁtable to make loans in the
second period, i.e. (qX − I)(1− μ) > μs1 (1 − l∗
1)I (1 − p) with l∗
1 as stated in Proposition 3.
From the perspective of social welfare, the total number of bankruptcy ﬁlings is relevant. In
our setup, it is socially optimal if all bad old ﬁrms are declared bankrupt. In Proposition 4, we
have shown that the number of ﬁrms declared bankrupt increases as the market share of bank 1
goes down. As banks become more symmetric, the degree of competition increases, the number of
ﬁrms declared bankrupt increases and, in turn, social welfare improves.
(2) Eﬀect of the Bankruptcy Filings on the Credit Market
We have shown that the repayment oﬀered to new applicants depends on the degree of bank
competition. According to this “direct eﬀect”, the lower bank 1’s market share, the lower the
repayment. Moreover, the repayment is inﬂuenced by the bankruptcy decision of the banks. This
decision is also determined by the market share of the banks. According to this “indirect eﬀect”,
an increasing market share of bank 1 increases (s1 ≥   s1) or decreases (s1 <   s1) the number of
bankruptcy ﬁlings and thereby the repayment decreases or increases. Thus, these are two opposing
eﬀects for high market shares of bank 1. The ultimate question is how bank competition inﬂuences
the repayment for new applicants.
Proposition 5. New applicants expect to repay less and have a higher probability of receiving a
loan as the degree of bank competition increases, i.e., as s1 decreases, and as the liquidation value
L increases.
18Proof: See the Appendix.
Suppose that bank 1 has a market share signiﬁcantly below the threshold value   s1.F o r a
low market share the adverse selection problem between banks is less severe. As bank 1’s market
share increases, the adverse selection problem becomes more severe and the repayment increases.
Moreover, the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings by bank 1 decreases so that the adverse selection
problem becomes even more severe. Here the indirect eﬀect magniﬁes the direct eﬀect.
What happens if the market share of bank 1 is rather high (s1 ≥   s1)?T h e na ni n c r e a s ei ns1
increases the share of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt. Therefore, the adverse selection problem
decreases. However, the direct eﬀect of competition which increases the repayment dominates.
Thus, as bank 1’s market share increases, competition between banks becomes less intensive. But
the increasing direct eﬀect of a higher market share is reduced by the higher share of ﬁrms declared
bankrupt.
Moreover, the liquidation value also inﬂuences the probability of new ﬁrms getting loans. Since
a higher liquidation value gives bank 1 the incentive to have more bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt,
bank competition intensiﬁes, the new applicant’s expected repayment decreases and the probability
of it getting a loan increases. The institutional environment has an impact on new ﬁrms through
this mechanism. If the quality of institutions such as the legal system is poor, the terms of the
credit contract are less attractive and access to ﬁn a n c ei sm o r ed i ﬃcult. This increases the costs
of ﬁnancing for the ﬁrms.
III. Discussion of Results
So far, we have focussed on the case of two banks that have diﬀerent market shares. This
diﬀerence in market shares implies that they have information about a diﬀerent fraction of the old
customer population. Because information is asymmetric, banking is not perfectly competitive. A
comparable situation would arise if the banks had identical market shares in the initial period but
diﬀerent shares of bad old ﬁrms in their portfolios, i.e. if (1−p) diﬀered between bank 1 and bank
192. The bank that has more bad old ﬁrms in the portfolio can (potentially) release more bad old
ﬁrms into the pool of new applicants. In the terms of our model, it would be considered to be the
bigger bank (bank 1). The more asymmetric the banks, the lower the incentive to have bad old
ﬁrms declared bankrupt.
In a model with N identical banks, the adverse selection problem which each bank faces is much
higher than in the case of two banks. Each bank has information only about a fraction of 1
N of the





of bad old ﬁrms applies
(where lj is the share of bad old ﬁrms which the other banks had declared bankrupt). The degree
of asymmetric information determines the repayment. Thus, the higher the number of banks, the
more severe the adverse selection problem and the higher the repayment (for a given liquidation
decision of all other banks).14
The objective function of bank i when it decides about having bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt
is, as before, given by equation (1).I tt r a d e so ﬀ the eﬀect which its decision has on the liquidation
payoﬀ, the rent extracted from the good old ﬁrms, and the proﬁt from the free market. The proﬁt
f r o mt h ef r e em a r k e tw i l lb ep o s i t i v ei fb a n ki ﬁles fewer ﬁrms for bankruptcy than the other banks.
For very high liquidation values, all banks have their defaulting customers declared bankrupt.
For very low liquidation values, banks do not have any of their customers declared bankrupt.
For intermediate liquidation values, the optimal fraction of ﬁrms which bank i will have declared
bankrupt depends on the expectation bank i has about the decisions taken by all other banks. If
bank i expects that all other banks have only a low share of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt, it,
too, will only have a low share of ﬁrms declared bankrupt. However, if bank i expects that all other
banks have a high share of ﬁrms declared bankrupt, it will also have a high share of ﬁrms declared
bankrupt. If the other banks have a high share of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt, the degree of
14A similar problem arises, for example, in Broecker (1990). Banks can invest in screening and generate signals on
the creditworthiness that are independent of each other. Since they reject those applicants that generate a negative
signal, information between banks is asymmetric. The empirical evidence provided by Shaﬀer (1998) is consistent
with a higher degree of asymmetric information in less concentrated markets.
20asymmetric information decreases and thereby the rents that can be extracted from good old ﬁrms
and new applicants decrease as well. Thus, bank i’s incentive to have ﬁrms declared bankrupt
is higher. Since all banks are equal, a symmetric equilibrium exists in which, depending on the
expectations, either a low share or a high share of defaulting ﬁrms is declared bankrupt.
The results of the comparative static analysis are largely conﬁrmed. As the liquidation values
increases, the number of bankruptcies increases and thereby decreases the repayment. A higher
number of banks implies that more bad old ﬁrms are ﬁled for bankruptcy. Since the rents that
can be extracted by bank i depend less on its own decision if there are more banks, what is gained
from having the ﬁrms declared bankrupt is relatively higher than the information rent which must
be given up. Therefore, the share of bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt increases in the number of
banks. Moreover, we have argued that, for a given level of bankruptcy ﬁlings, a higher number of
banks increases the repayment because the adverse selection problem between banks is more severe
(direct eﬀect). However, the rate of bankruptcy ﬁlings increases in N. A higher rate of bankruptcy
ﬁlings implies a lower repayment (indirect eﬀect). In total, the repayment increases in N,w h i c h
implies that the indirect eﬀect is not strong enough to reverse the direct eﬀect although it does
reduce its size.
Moreover, we focus on a situation without a credit registry. Information sharing will reduce
the rents from asymmetric information that the informed bank obtains. As long as there is some
asymmetric information, the bank faces the trade-oﬀ described in the model. Given the limited
coverage of credit registries in most parts of the world, and the fact that inaccuracies and errors
occur, some asymmetric information prevails. The incentive to have a defaulting ﬁrm declared
bankrupt decreases as information becomes more symmetric.
IV. Empirical Implications
From our model, we can derive hypotheses for the eﬀect of the quality of institutions and
bank competition on the number of bankruptcies and on the credit market. There are several
21empirical studies about the eﬀects that we have shown in the model. However, none of these
studies investigates all the eﬀects derived in the model, each focuses on one particular eﬀect. In
general, the results of our model are conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence.
Concerning the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings the prediction is very clear. As the legal envi-
ronment improves and the banking sector becomes more competitive, the number of bankruptcy
ﬁlings should increase. Most data is on the aggregate number of bankruptcy ﬁlings. In the Eu-
ropean Union, there is a clear diﬀerence between western European countries and the new EU
member states where institutions are still deﬁcient but improving. In the latter region, the number
of bankruptcy ﬁlings per 10,000 ﬁr m si ss i g n i ﬁcantly lower (Creditreform, 2006). However, these
numbers do not reveal who initiated the bankruptcy procedure. In Hungary, banks are the creditors
least likely to initiate bankruptcy and contribute only about 11 per cent of the cases (Franks and
Lóránth, 2004). Similar ﬁgures are found for Russia, where about 20 per cent of the cases were
initiated by private creditors including banks (Pistor, 2006). These ﬁgures indicate that banks
remain passive. Within the banking sector, our model predicts that bigger banks are more passive.
To test this prediction more detailed data about who initiates bankruptcy would be needed.
Regarding the interest rates, we predict that these decrease as the legal environment improves
and bank competition becomes more intense. The eﬀect that better judicial eﬃciency and judicial
enforcement (as measured by the degree of property rights protection and the rule of law) lower
the interest rate spreads of banks is conﬁrmed by Laeven and Majnoni (2005) for a large cross-
section of countries. Jappelli et al. (2005) study the eﬀect of the quality of legal enforcement (as
measured by the length of trials and the stock of pending trials) on the interest rate. However, the
eﬀect that better legal enforcement reduces interest rates is not signiﬁcant in all regressions. To
test the mechanism described in this paper, we would need data about the number of bankruptcy
cases initiated by banks (either as a time-series or as a cross-section). We predict that, as the
legal environment improves and/ or bank competition increases, the number of bankruptcy cases
increases, and as a consequence, the interest rate decreases.
22Finally, we can derive predictions for the probability of credit rationing and the share of non-
performing loans. As the legal environment improves and/ or bank competition increases, the
share of non-performing loans that the outside banks grant falls as more bad old ﬁrms are declared
bankrupt. As a consequence of the lower information asymmetry, banks grant loans with a higher
probability. Thus, credit rationing is reduced. A recent cross-country study conﬁrms that countries
with a better legal environment enjoy higher degrees of ﬁnancial intermediation. However, if the
sample is split up into rich and poor countries, the coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant for the rich countries
(Djankov et al., 2007). But evidence from poorer countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, shows
that more loans are granted in states with better legal protection (Castelar Pinheiro and Cabral,
2001; Cristini et al., 2001). For Argentina, it is also found that banks in states with higher
judicial eﬃciency have lower shares of credits in arrears (Cristini et al., 2001). However, neither
of these studies takes into account the creditworthiness of the applicants. Better data is available
for households in Italy. There, the probability that a credit proposal is turned down increases as
judicial ineﬃciency becomes more severe. This could indicate that, as a result of judicial ineﬃciency,
the liquidation value decreases and therefore banks are less willing to lend. By providing higher
amounts of collateral, borrowers could improve their access to bank loans. Interestingly, the eﬀect
of the availability of collateral on the probability of credit approval is insigniﬁcant although it
has the expected positive sign (Fabbri and Padula, 2004). Our study shows that an additional
explanatory variable should be taken into account. The lower the number of bankruptcy cases in
a province, the more severe the adverse selection problem and the less banks are willing to grant
loans. This implies that, by controlling for the number of bankruptcy cases in a province, the eﬀect
of the availability of collateral should become signiﬁcant.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that to soften competition bank’s have an incentive to apply the deci-
sion to have a ﬁrm declared bankrupt strategically. We have shown that the incentive to liquidate
23defaulting ﬁrms depends on the quality of institutions and the degree of bank competition. In-
stitutions, in turn, determine the payoﬀ a creditor gets from liquidating a ﬁrm. Therefore, our
analysis further explains why creditors in countries with deﬁcient institutions are passive. This
creates a kind of soft budget constraint for ineﬃcient ﬁrms - since their informed bank does not
have them declared bankrupt, they may receive loans from outside banks. However, if creditors
remain passive, the degree of asymmetric information between banks is high. Due to the resulting
adverse selection problem, the repayments are also high and banks are less willing to grant loans
to new applicants.
We have shown that the decision to have ﬁrms declared bankrupt has a strategic eﬀect as it
reduces asymmetric information between banks and renders bank competition more intensive. We
are also able to evaluate an increase in the number of banks. If more banks compete on the market,
the individual bank has a higher incentive to have bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt. As a result,
the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings increases in the number of banks and this has a negative eﬀect
on repayments.
What can be done by governments in order to improve the situation? The appropriate policy
measures are the improvement of institutions, the reduction of the adverse selection problem, and
an increase in bank competition. With respect to our analysis, an important step is to improve
the legal framework. The liquidation of a ﬁrm’s assets is expensive from a social welfare point of
view because seizing the assets is costly and the secondary markets work ineﬃciently. The social
loss will decrease if the legal systems function better. Reforms are necessary in two respects. Laws
have to be drafted more carefully in order to avoid ambiguities. Even more importantly, the law
enforcement must be faster and its results more predictable.
Furthermore, there should be more competition in the banking sector. Information plays a
crucial role in fostering bank competition. The adverse selection problem between banks must
be mitigated through diﬀerent measures. By improving the informational contents of ﬁnancial
statements, a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation becomes less opaque for potential lenders. However, reaching
24as i g n i ﬁcant improvement will take time. In the meantime, inventing public credit registries could
serve as a means for publishing information about ineﬃcient ﬁrms. Jappelli and Pagano (2000)
observe that public credit registries are more frequent in countries where law enforcement is less
eﬃcient and creditor rights are not very well protected. At least in theory, the degree of adverse
selection between banks decreases through credit registries, and the incentive to liquidate ﬁrms
increases. However, it is not obvious why banks are willing to provide information about a ﬁrm.
From our analysis it is clear that they will not give information about a ﬁrm’s type if they are
not compensated by a suﬃciently high liquidation payoﬀ. Thus, public credit registries have to be
designed carefully to make sure that the reports banks submit are correct. Survey evidence about
the information contained in private credit registries in the US suggests this is a challenge for the
system (Cassady and Mierzwinski, 2004). This challenge would be even greater in emerging market
economies where they are needed most.
25Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Step 1: We show that old customers stay with their informed bank.
• Bad old customers are denied credit by their informed bank because they generate a payoﬀ
of 0 <I.
• Due to the sequential nature of oﬀers, bank 1 underbids bank 2 marginally (and vice versa)
and keeps its good old ﬁrms, i.e. R1 = R2, because the old ﬁrms have a slight preference for
the informed bank.
Step 2: We show that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
R denotes the repayment that bank 2 needs for making zero expected proﬁt.
Suppose there exists a symmetric equilibrium with R1 = R2 >R .B a n k1 has an incentive to
marginally undercut R2 and still make a positive expected proﬁt. Suppose that R1 = R2 = R.
Bank 1 has an incentive to undercut bank 2 and still make positive expected proﬁt. In this case,
bank 2 would make an expected loss and, thus, it would be better to make no oﬀer at all. Then,
bank 1 would act like a monopolist and demand R1 = X. The optimal reaction of bank 2 would
be to marginally undercut bank 1 and make positive expected proﬁts. As a result, no symmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Suppose there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose that R1 >R 2 >R .
Bank 1 has an incentive to marginally undercut bank 2 and make positive expected proﬁt. Suppose
that R1 >R 2 = R.B a n k1 has an incentive to undercut bank 2 and still make positive expected
proﬁt. In this case, bank 2 would make an expected loss and, thus, it would be better to make
no oﬀer at all. Suppose that R2 >R 1 ≥ R.B a n k2 has incentive to demand a marginally lower
repayment than bank 1 and make a non-negative proﬁt. Thus, we do not ﬁnd an asymmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies.
26Step 3: We show that Fi (R) and Fj (R) are continuous and strictly monotonously increasing on
an interval (R,X).
Suppose that Fj is discontinuous at R∗, i.e. there exists an atom in Fj,t h e nb a n ki’s action of
playing R∗−  strictly dominates playing R∗+ ,   > 0. Therefore, bank i will not bid a free-market
repayment [R∗,R ∗ +  ). But then bank j can raise its repayment without losing customers, so R∗
cannot be an optimal action for bank j.H e n c e ,Fj must be continuous.
Suppose that Fj is non-increasing over some interval, i.e. there exists an interval (Ra,R b) ⊆
(R,X) for which fi (R)=0∀ R (Ra,R b).B u tt h e nprob(Ri <R j | Ri = Ra)=
prob(Ri <R j | Ri (Ra,R b)), but proﬁts are strictly higher for Ri >R a (conditional on winning),
so that bank i maximizes its payoﬀ by playing Ri = Rb and hence would never oﬀer a repayment
in the interval. But then bank j can increase its proﬁts by playing Rj = Rb −   with positive
probability, where   <R b − Ra, since this will lead to strictly higher proﬁts than any interest
rate oﬀer in a neighborhood of Ra. However, this contradicts the assumption that fi (R)=0∀
R (Ra,R b).
Step 4: We determine the equilibrium in mixed strategies as described in the proposition.
Consider the proﬁt function of bank i (i  = j and i =1 ,2) conditional on bank j’s oﬀer.
Πi(Ri)=( 1− μ)(1− Fj (Ri))(qRi − I)+μsj (1 − lj)(1− p)(−I) ∀Ri [R,X).
Bank i will participate only if Πi(Ri) ≥ 0 or
lim
R→X
(1 − Fj (R)) ≥
μsj (1 − lj)(1− p)
(1 − μ)(qRi − I)
I
There are two ways for getting lim
R→X
(1 − Fj (R)) > 0:
• There is an atom at X in Fj. However, an atom cannot exist in both Fi and Fj since then
neither Ri = X nor Rj = X would be optimal.
• Either bank i or bank j does not always bid on the free market. As shown below, this has to
be the smaller bank. This implies that its expected proﬁt is zero because each oﬀer generates
27t h es a m ep r o ﬁt.
Step 5: We determine the minimum repayment R. R is determined by the condition that bank 2
wins the free market with certainty:
Π2(R)=( 1− μ)(qR− I)+μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)(−I)=0
R =
(1 − μ)+μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)
(1 − μ)q
I
Step 6: We determine bank 1’s expected proﬁt.
Bank 1’s return for R is:
Π1(R)=( 1 − μ)(qR− I)+μs2 (1 − l2)(1− p)(−I)
=( s1 (1 − l1) − s2 (1 − l2))μ(1 − p)I ≡ Π1 > 0
Thus, it is shown that bank 2 does not always bid on the free market and therefore makes zero
expected proﬁt.
Step 7: We determine the mixing probabilities.
Let us use the fact that Π1(R1)=Π1 and Π2(R2)=0for each repayment.
• For bank 1 we determine F1(R) by setting
Π2(R2)=( 1− μ)(1− F1 (R2))(qR2 − I)+μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)(−I)=0
Accordingly, F1 (R)=1−
μs1(1−l1)(1−p)









• For bank 2 we determine F2(R) by setting
Π1(R1)=( 1− μ)(1− F2 (R1))(qR1 − I)+μs2 (1 − l2)(1− p)(−I)=Π1
28Bank 2 does not make an oﬀer with probability prob(D)=
μs1(1−l1)(1−p)
(1−μ)(qX−I) I. With probability 1−
prob(D) i tc h oo s e sr e p a y m e n t sa c c o r d i n gt oF2 (R)=1 −
μs1(1−l1)(1−p)






Provided that bank 2 oﬀers a loan it chooses repayments according to the following cumulative
distribution function G2 (R)=
(qX−I)((1−μ)(qR−I)−μs1(1−l1)(1−p)I)












=0and G2 (X)=1 . Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
From the good old ﬁrms in its portfolio bank 1 demands the same R as oﬀered by bank 2.
If bank 2 does not oﬀer a loan, bank 1 demands R = X. This happens with prob(D).F r o m
the good old ﬁrms in its portfolio bank 2 demands the same R as oﬀered by bank 1.I f b a n k 1
demands X,b a n k2 demands X as well. This happens with prob(R1 = X)=prob(D).B a n k1 and
bank 2 also mix on the same range and put equal weight on each repayment (F1 (R)=F2 (R) and
prob(R1 = X)=prob(D)). Thus, both banks get the same rent from the good old ﬁrms, denoted
by ΠGO










qμs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)I




μs1 (1 − l1)(1− p)I
(1 − μ)(qX − I)
X − I
= I









(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− μ)
(1 − μ)q









> 0 because we assumed
that (qX − I)(1− μ) > μs1I (1 − p). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Step 1: We assume that (1 − l2)s2 < (1 − l1)s1.
Bank 1 maximizes its expected payoﬀ Π1 (l1,l 2) by choosing l1










(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− μ)
(1 − μ)q
+((1 − l1)s1 − (1 − l2)s2)μ(1 − p)I
29Diﬀerentiating this payoﬀ with respect to l1 yields the following ﬁrst order condition:



















      
marginal cost (information rent)
= L     
marginal beneﬁt








Step 2: We assume that (1 − l2)s2 > (1 − l1)s1.
Bank 2 maximizes its expected payoﬀ by choosing l2










(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− μ)
(1 − μ)q
+((1 − l2)s2 − (1 − l1)s1)μ(1 − p)I
Diﬀerentiating this payoﬀ with respect to l2 yields the following ﬁrst order condition:


















Step 3: We show that (1 − l∗




2, we get that (1 − l∗
2)s2 < (1 − l∗
1)s1 if
(1 − μ)(qX − I)
s2μ(1 − p)I exp
 
q(1 − μ) L−I
μps2I
 s2 <
(1 − μ)(qX − I)
s1μ(1 − p)I exp
 
q(1 − μ) L−I
μps1I
 s1.

















<q (1 − μ)
L − I
μps2I
as s2 <s 1 < 1 and I<L . Q.E.D.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4














Thus, as the liquidation value increases, bank 1 has more bad old ﬁrms declared bankrupt.
2. Eﬀect of competition on the number of ﬁrms declared bankrupt













as the sign of the denominator is ambiguous because q(1 − μ)(I − L)
      
−
+ μps1I






∂s1 =0we derive the threshold value   s1 =
q(1−μ)(L−I)
Iμp for which the sign of the
derivation changes. For s1 <   s1 we get
∂l∗
1




• Eﬀect on total number of ﬁrms declared bankrupt (s1l∗
1 +( 1− s1)1)
The total number bankruptcy ﬁlings is
(s1l∗
1 +( 1− s1)1)=1−
(1 − μ)(qX − I)
exp
 
q(1 − μ) L−I
μps1I
 
μI (1 − p)
Comparative statics with respect to s1 yields
∂ ((s1l∗




2 (L − I)(qX − I)
exp
 
q(1 − μ) L−I
μps1I
 
μ2I2 (1 − p)ps2
1
< 0
Thus, as the market share of bank 1 increases, the number of ﬁrms declared bankrupt
decreases.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
1. Eﬀect of liquidation value
• on repayment
31We have shown that
∂l∗
1
∂L > 0 and that ∂R
∂l∗
1 < 0. It follows that ∂R
∂L < 0.
• on the probability of getting a loan
Bank 1 oﬀers a loan with probability 1. However, bank 2 does not oﬀer a loan with
probability prob(D)=
μs1(1−l1)(1−p)
(1−μ)(qX−I) I.F r o m
∂l∗
1
∂L > 0 it follows that
∂prob(D)
∂L < 0.T h u s ,
a higher liquidation value increases the probability that a new applicants gets a loan.
2. Eﬀect of bank 1’s market share
• on repayment


































Comparative statics with respect to s1 yield
∂E(R)













  > 0.
• on the probability of getting a loan
Bank 1 oﬀers a loan with probability 1. However, bank 2 does not oﬀer a loan with
probability prob(D)=
μs1(1−l1)(1−p)













> 0. Thus, as the market share of
bank 1 increases, the probability that a new applicant gets a loan decreases.
Q.E.D.
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